For scholars studying international conflict and war, the idea that domestic political institutions might affect patterns of military conflict has gained considerable acceptance over the past decade. The most prominent body of work linking domestic politics to conflict patterns is known broadly as the "democratic peace" literature.
Nevertheless, the literature to date continues to focus on an important but narrow aspect of the relationship between domestic politics and international behavior: the relationship between democracy and war.
We believe that much more work can and should be done to link domestic political institutions to international behavior. Of the many possible areas worthy of exploration, in this chapter we attempt to extend the literature in two broad directions. The first concern we have is that existing work focuses primarily on a relatively limited dependent variable-the onset of war. Yet the absence of war and the resolution of a dispute are two very different phenomena. In this chapter we consider the conditions under which state leaders might actively cooperate with one another to resolve a disputed issue, thereby reducing or even eliminating the possibility of war. In other words, we look to see when leaders will successfully pursue diplomatic efforts to settle disputes, not simply when they will manage to avoid taking up arms over a disputed issue. Our second goal is to push the agenda on the independent variable side. While existing work has theorized about differences in international conflict behavior across different regime types, we also believe that salient differences should exist within a given regime type. Among democratic leaders, for example, we should expect to find important differences in international behavior under different domestic institutional arrangements. Our overall argument in this chapter is that the degree to which the polity is divided should have a significant impact on the willingness of democratic leaders to make concessions to resolve existing disputes. In this chapter, then, we set out to link the divided government literature, which to date has looked primarily at international economic cooperation, with the international conflict literature, which thus far has largely ignored the issue of how state leaders might cooperate to resolve international disputes.
In particular, we examine the behavior of state leaders during bilateral rounds of talks over disputed territory and test hypotheses about whether the degree of divided government affects leaders' decisions to make concessions in these rounds of talks. Our dataset comprises 1,528 rounds of rounds talks drawn from 348 territorial disputes that span the period 1919-1995. 3 Each of the disputes in our dataset has the same basic structure. In each dispute there is a challenger state that has a standing claim to some piece of territory and desires to change the territorial status quo, as well as a target state that currently possesses the disputed territory. Furthermore, when engaged in negotiations over the disputed territory, both states ultimately decide to make either: (1) no concessions, (2) limited concessions, or (3) major concessions. For each round of talks, then, we code the level of concessions made by both the challenger and target state.
Looking at territorial disagreements provides a number of advantages. For one, all territorial disputes share a common structure and present a similar set of options to the states involved. By looking at disputes over territory, we control for the influence of possible conflating factors. Furthermore, territorial issues typically are of considerable interest to members of the legislature or parliament, as well to citizens broadly. Thus leaders who are negotiating over territory must be sensitive to the anticipated domestic political reactions to their negotiating decisions. As a result, negotiations over disputed territory constitute a particularly useful way to probe the impact of domestic political institutions on international cooperation.
Negotiations over disputed territory also share many of the features of a two-level game (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Putnam 1988) . The two state leaders (executives) go to the bargaining table at Level I and both
